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of Chicago, and Senior Research Associate at NBER.Since the early sixties, students have been attracted to the study and
to the practice of law. The number of lawyers increased by 33 percent between
1960 and 1970 after growing by just l4 percent during the previous decade.
Interest in the law has not declined since 1970. The annual number of new ad-
missions to the Bar was higher in 1975 than in 1970 by 91 percent. This rapid
growth, while unusual, is not unprecedented in the United States, as witness the
30 percent increase in the number of lawyers (and judges) from 1920 to 1930
(Table 1, nor is it limited to the United States, as witness the increase in
the number of lawyers in Canada and in England during the sixties. Table 1
also shows the United States has been historically more lawyer intensive than
Canadaand England.
The renewed interest in the practice of the law andthese international
comparisons,crude as they are, raise several questions about the underlying
determinants of the demand for lawyers. The prosperity of the twenties and sixties
indicates the level of economic activity is an important determinant of the demand
for laywers. The role of government regulation is less obvious and more difficult
to detect. It is often said the social legislation of the sixties, the expanding
scope of government regulations and judicial rulings are responsible for the
increase in the number of lawyers. Those who advance the regulation hypothesis
often support it with evidence from the sixties. The appeal of the regulation
hypothesis is reduced if a longer span of time is studied. The regulation
hypothesis does not explain why the U.S. has been historically more lawyer
intensive than Canada and England and cannot explain the rapid growth in
lawyers during the twenties. Nor does economic theory unambiguously predict
an increase in regulation will increase the number of lawyers. At least some
types of regulations of industry simultaneously raise the cost of production
and increase the use of lawyers. Regulations of this type, e.g. noise or
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































industry output and employment because of higher product prices. whether this
type of regulation increases the number of lawyers, depends on the strength of
these two opposing forces.!' Economic theory and some of the empirical evidence
suggests that government regulation may not be an important a determinant of
the demand for lawyers. Clearly some additional evidence on the comparative
effect of income, regulation as well as other variables on the demand for
lawyers is called for.
Professional training in law often requires three years of schooling.
Specialized training could lead to oscillatory or "cobweb" patterns in earnings
and numberof lawyers if prospective entrants fail to correctly forecast future
demand and cost conditions. Recent concern has been expressed that the current
large enrollments in law schools will depress earnings in law as the market
.
adjuststo the large graduating classes. Freeman [l97!+] provides some results
suggesting that such oscillations are an important characteristic of the market
for lawyers. There are, however, several reasons to suspect that oscillations
due to systemmatic forecast errors cannot be of great importance in the market
for lawyers. The training of lawyers is sufficiently general that recent
graduates could and have substituted into other business occupations if and
when earnings in law are unduly depressed. In addition, systematic forecast
errors committed by prospective law students imply the periodic existence of
profitable investments in legal education. These reasons suggest a reconsider-
ation of the legal market to determine if cobweb patterns are in fact an
important phenomenon of the market for lawyers.
!'Ifnew legislation or administrative rulings reduce uncertainty at a
lower transaction cost than would occur within the existing legal system in
the absence of the new legislation, then the demand for lawyers may decline
with added regulation.Another objective of this paper is to investigate the speed of adjust-
ment of law schools to shifts in the demand for lawyers. Law schools are
members of private nonprofit and public educational institutions. A large
proportion of law schools are approved by the American Bar Association (ABA).
Profit making law schools are excluded from the market and have been opposed
by the A.B.A. The organization of the legal education industry and the effect
of this type of organization on property rights and on the speed of adjust-
ment of enrollments to shifts in demand have not been given serious attention.
Section I presents a theortical model of the demand for and supply of
lawyers. The empirical counterpafts of the variables are introduced in Section
II. Section III presents the results of the estimation and Section IV compares
the actual number of lawyers with the number that would have existed if lawyers
earned a normal return on their investment in legal education. Section V
presents other evidence of an excess demand for lawyers and offers several
explanations for the speed of adjustment of enrollments in law schools to shifts
in the demand for lawyers. The paper ends with a summary of the major findings
of the paper.
I. The Theoretical Model
The number of practicing lawyers in year t equals a fraction of the
number practicing in year t -1plus a fraction of new admissions to the bar
in year t.
Not all new admissions begin the practice of law. While the depreci-
ation rate of new admissions may differ from the rate for existing lawyers, it
could be higher or lower. Older and more experienced lawyers have greater
investments in on the job training and would have lower depreciation rates to
offset the higher rates due to retirements, etc.
.5
(1) Lt =(1-d)[Lti +
where d denotes the depreciation rate and measures the effects of voluntary
quits, deaths and retirements. New admissions to the bar in t equal some
proportion of first year law students in year t -3,Ft3
(2) t =cF3
where c is the proportion of first year students in t -3who have com-
pleted law school and passed the bar examination in t. is a random vari-
able and represents successful candidates who have failed the bar examination
in previous attempts or have taken longer to complete law school because they
were part time students.
The demand for legal services in t is given by
(3) LS
= + + a2Z + Ut a1 < 0, a>0
where LS denotes the quantity of legal services demanded, LEt denotes the
annual earnings per lawyer, Z. is a vector of exogenous variables (discussed
in detail below) and u is a disturbance terni)1
'Thequantity demanded is normally related to the price charged per
day (hour), t• Earnings have been used as a substitute. This approximation
is acceptable if total days worked per year, ht and the share of total revenues
accounted for by operating costs, vt, have not changed appreciably over time.
Under these assumptions
Pt vtEt =yLEt where =6
The quantity of legal services supplied, LS is assumed to increase
with the number of lawyers, Lt, and the earnings of lawyers. The existing
stock of lawyers supplies more services by increasing the use of other factors
when legal earnings rise and increases in the number of lawyers increases the
supply of legal services, given legal earnings
(1k) LS o + iLEt + 2Lt + Vt i' 2 >
where Vt is a disturbance term. Under this formulation an increase in
earnings outside of the legal industry does not have an immediate effect on
the supply of legal services but reduces the supply of legal services in the
long run by reducing the number of lawyers. Given the stock of lawyers,
D S LS =LS when
(-a)+L-aZ + -u
t
Since - <0, LE. decreases with Lt and increases with Z..
In long run equilibrium the number of lawyers is determined so that
prospective law student anticipates a normal rate of return on the investment
in legal education. If the number of lawyers is less than this equi1ibrum
number, the anticipated rate of return on the investment in legal education wi1
exceed the normal rate of return. The number of' first year law students will
increase and three years later the number of lawyers will increase. This
adjustment to long run equilibrium maybedescribed with the aid of'graphs.
Let the demand curve for legal services be given by DD in Figure 1. If the
current number of lawyers is L1, the supply curve of legal services is given7
by SS. Assume a college graduate can earn U dollars per year.Because
the college graduate must forego U for three years while attending law
school, the graduate will enter law school only if LE > (1 +r)3U.W
Because LE1 > (1 +r)U,the anticipated rate of return from legal training
exceeds the normal rate of return, r. Law school enrollments and the number of
lawyers increase. The supply curve shifts to S'S'. The number of lawyers
increases to L2, earnings decline to (1 +r)3Uand the quantity of legal
services increases to LS2. The market is now in long run equilibrium since a
normal rate of return is earned on the investment in legal education
In long run equilibrium the annual earnings of a lawyer may be expected
to exceed (1 +r)3U.The probability of completing law school and passing the
bar examination within three years of beginning law school has been appreciably
less than one, varying from an estimated low of .26 in 1938 to a high of .7
in 1969 over the l925-l94O and 1951-1970 periods.' Embarking on a legal
career has been a somewhat risky endeavor. It is iossible to derive an estimate
of long run equilibrium earnings that reflects the probability of failure.
The present value of earnings for a college graduate is:
1••
i=C(l+r)1
The present value of earnings for a college graduate who enters and completes
law school is (ignoring tuition):
LE
i=3 (1 +r)1
These two streams are equal if LE =(1+r)3U.
-"'Thesefigures overestimate the degree of uncertainty since many
















The probability of completing law school, ,andthe probability of
passing the bar examination, p, help determine the annual earnings of a lawyer
when the market is in long run equilibrium. In Appendix A the long run




L p(l+r) (l+r)p (l+r) p (1+r) p
where 1 +rh(0 < h < 1)is the assumed rate of return earned by a law student
who has graduated but has not passed the bar exaznlnation)1 Equation (6) indi-
cates the real earnings of lawyers should exceed the real earnings of college
graduates by more than (1 +r)Uif p or is less than one. Table II
shows that a change in has a larger effect on the LE to U ratio than a
comparable change in
Equation (6) may be modified to reflect the uncertainty of future
earnings of lawyers and college graduates. In long run equilibrium the fore-
cast made in t -3of real annual earnings per lawyer in t,t_3t'
is
'The time subscripts onp and have been surpressed in equation
(7) for convenience.
This result assumes that a candidate who fails the bar exam tries
again and again while a student that fails out of law school does not re-enter
law school.10
related to the forecast made in t -3of real annual earnings of a college
graduate in t, through
(8) t_3LEt =t_3U(1
+r)3Ht
Equation (8) defines an equilibrium in terms of the forecasts of the
earnings of a representative lawyer and a representative college graduate. With
rational expectations the forecast of earnings in t made by first year law
students in t -3is assumed equal to the mean of the distribution of lawyer
earnings in t [Muth, 1961].
t3t =
whereE denotes the mathematical expectation given the information available
in t -3.First year law students are assumed to neither systematically over
or under estimate their future earnings under rational expectations.
In t -3anticipated lawyer earnings in t will depend on the current
stock of lawyers, Lt3, the current flow through the pipeline,
Ft5, Ft, Ft3
and the forecast of the exogeneous variable in the demand curve This
result may be derived formally by first noting that Lt is related to
Lt3,










Substituting (10) into (5) and the result into (9) and then taking the11
TABLE II
RATIO OF LE TO U FOR SELECTED VALUES OFTHE PROBABILITY
OF COMPLETING LAWSCHOOLAND TUE PROBABILITY
OF PASSING TEE BAR EXAMINATIONW
w .. . pdenotes the probability ofpassing the bar examination
pdenotes the probability of completinglaw school. Note: Ratios are calculatedassuming (li-i') =1.1and h =.7.
in a given periodmathematical expectation, yields thed::iredequation for
(ii)
=(0_a0)_3Zt+ 2[ (l_d)3L + (l_d)3ct 2Ft + (l_d)2ct iFt+ (l_d)ctFt3]
The equilibrium number of first year students enrolled in t -3 when
the market is expected to be in a long run equilibrium in t can be derived
by substituting from (ii) into (8) and by solving for F3.
(i) F3
-d)ct
F3 denotes the equilibrium number of first year law students given the
forecast of Z, the stock of lawyers in t -3, thesize of the entering
classes in t - andt -5and current completion rates.-" The
taking the mathematical expectation it is assumed that
(1) c1 (i =0,1,2)are predicted without error;(2) t?t_l =0
(i =0,1,2)and (3)t_3vt
-
Ut)0. Completion rates, ce., are treated
as exogenous. A more general study would attempt to explain changes over time
in the completion rates.
'If thecompletion rates vary with the size of the first year class,
the observed completion rate will differ from the (unobserved) completion rate
that would exist if the first year class equals Ft_3. In the empirical work
reported below the observed completion rates are substituted for the completion
rates that would be observed if a long run equilibrium was continuously achieved.
However, completion rates will in general depend on relative earnings and there-
for on the size of the first year class, Therefore, some measurement error is
introduced with this assumption. A more general formulation would make the
completion rate endceneous.13
equilibrium number of new admissions in t is given by
100+a2Zt+(a,1_i)HU
— t-3 t-3 ti d L t —[
-- '1t-3t-1
Equation (13) requires that new admissions in period t equal the difference
between the number of lawyers demanded at the anticipated equilibrium earnings
per laywer (the expression in the square brackets) and the expected number of
lawyers in t as projected in t -3from the size of the entering classes
in t -14and t -5.
The actual number of first year students may be less than the long run
equilibrium number during periods of growth. Entry by profit making law
schools is prohibited and entry by nonprofit law schools is regulated by
minimumrequirementsestablished by the A.B.A. Within the nonprofit sector
the incentives for growth are attenuated. Tuition does not differ appreciably between
departments or professional schools and is independent of demand conditions.
In many law schools tuition could have been increased in the last ten years or
so without reducing enrollment but with a lowering of the quality of student.
Yet, some law schools act as if any increase in the net income of the law
school due to an increase in tuition or enrollment will be taxed at a high
marginal rate. In particular, the incentive to increase enrollment is reduced
if the use in net income reverts to the central administration. The degree
of attenuation of property rights is not random across law schools. In his
pioneering study of law schools in the twenties Reed [1928] distinguished
between law schools in universities with extensive private endowments or
public support and those in universities with little private or public support.1j4
Law schools in universities with little private or public support were in
fact virtually independent operations whose net revenue depended on their
ability to attract tuition paying students. These law schools placed relatively
low prerequisites on prospective students requiring none or one year of college.
Well endowed law schools placed higher prerequisites on prospective students
by requiring a college degree. Differences in this type of behavior can be
explained by differences in property rights. While changes have occurred
since, the distinction between higher and lower quality schools remains a useful
one. In summary there are two reasons for expecting a slower response to a
shift in demand for lawyers: restrictions on the formation of new law schools
and the attenuation of property rights in existing law schools.JJ
If these arguments have some validity, the actual number of first year
students may at times differ from the equilibrium number.The speed of response
by the legal education industry to shifts in demand can be estimated and the
model has been formulated to provide some estimates of this response rate.
it is assumed that the number of places in law schools for first year students
is always large enough to satisfy replacement demand due to retirements, etc.
The number of first year students required to satisfy replacement demand equals
(dt3Lti)/(ct(l_d)). A second assumption is that places for first year
students expand so that a proportion, w, of the discrepancy between the
equilibriumnumber of lawyers in t and the projected number of lawyers in t,
attenuationof property rights should also exist in other fields
as well, e.g. business. If the legal education industry respondçs less rapidly
than the business education industry, it is presumably because of differences
in the cost of entry.
.15
is satisfied)' Under these two assumptions the observed number of
first year students equals:
lao -+ az +(a1_1)Ht L






where 0 <U)<1.If U1,the actual number of first year law students
equals the equilibrium number.
By combining equations (1), (2), (12) and (1)4), Lt, and Ft3
can be expressed as














-) + az +- +r)3Ht U
Equations (15a)-(l5b) contain forecasts made in t -3of Lt_i, Z
and U.1. The empirical work has been simplified by assuming these predicted
!'The loss in the number oflawyers between t -1and t due to
depreciation is completely replaced.16
values equal the actual values of these variables plus a nonserial correlated
random variable. Under this assumption, the actual values of the variables
may be substituted for the predicted values. These substitutions are justified
in part because the series in question appear to be smooth and the forecast
errors are likely to be small.
Under these assumptions equations, the reduced form equations, (15a)-(15c),












where g., g, are random variables. Lt, and should be related
to the exogenous variables entering through Z. and the opportunity cost vari-
able (1 +r)3Ht3Ut. Lti enters with a positive coefficient in (l6a) and
a negative coefficient in (l6b) or (16c) if w > d. As w approaches zero
(one), the coefficients of Lt1 will approach one (zero) in (l6a) and zero
The analysis could be extendedby forecasting each of the exogenous
variables and then using these forecasts in the regression analysis. If
Z. = ÷ the use of Z. as an independent variable will introduce some
bias because the disturbance term in the regression includes which is
correlated with the independent variable Z. If the variance of is small
relative to the variance Z., the bias will be small.17
(minus one) in (16b) and (16c). Empirical estimates of the coefficients of
(16a) and (l6b are presented below.!'
II. Discussion of Selected Time Series, 1920-1970
A. Number of Lawyers, New Admissions and First Year Law Students
A continuous time series of lawyers from 1920 to 1970 does not exist.
The decennial census estimates of the number of lawyers may be combined with
the annual number of new admissions to the bar to produce an estimate of the
depreciation rate for each decade from the expression
Lt = (1-d)1t-i +(1-d)10Ltio
where Lt and Lt10 are Census of Population estimates of practicing lawyers1
and NAt. is known for i =0to i =9.A value of d may be determined
which satisfies the equality during each decade from 1910 to 1970. The
decennial estimates of d are shown below.
IlEquation (16c) could be estimated by usingDt/c and L1/ct
as independent variables. However, accurate estimates of c. are difficult
to obtain without separating full time from part time students. Some pre-
liminary results were not promising, perhaps because of the measurement errors
in
JMore precisely, the Census combineslawyers and judges.18
Depreciation Depreciation
Decade Ratio Decade Ratio
1910-1920 .030 191401950 .038
1920-1930 .031 1950-1960 .039
1930-191xJ .037 1960-1970 .o3o
Comparatively low depreciation rates were experienced from 1910 to 1930
and from 1960-1970. The highest depreciation rate occurred in the decade from
1950 to 1960. Itis likely that trends in the depreciation rates accurately
reflect the level of prosperity in the legal service industry. By this test
the periods from 1910 to 1930 and 1960-1970 were prosperous ones for the legal
profession.
Once the estimate of d is known for each decade, the number of
lawyers in each year of the decade may be estimated. As Table I indicates
the number of lawyers grew rapidly during the 1920's and in the l960's. This
may be seen even more clearly by examining the time path of new admissions
to the bar in Table III. New admissions increased rapidly after 1920 and
peaked in 1930. It is revealing that new admissions to the bar remained at
comparatively high levels during the first half of the thirties, averaging
9,)77 per year from 193019314. New admissions declined after i93L but still
averaged 8,772 per year from 1935-1939 compared to 9,132 per year from 1925-1929.
Given the large decline in real income from 1929 to 193)4, the modest decline
in new admissions over this period suggests that relative earnings of lawyers
remained high during the first half of the Depression. In the immediate post
war World War II period new admissions surged and then remained relatively
constant throughout the fifties at a level slightly higher than the late
twenties. New admissions have grown rapidly since 1963.19
.
TABLEIII







New Admissions 1930 =100
1920 5,586 56 1950 13,611.1 136
1922 6,530 65 1952 11,900 119
192)4 7,2)41 72 195l1 9,928 99
1926 9,025 90 1956 9,11.50 914.
1928 9,851 98 1958 10,14.65 105
1930 10,012 100 1960 10,505 105
1932 9,3140 93 1962 10,78)4 108
193)4 9,099 91 196)4 12,023 120
1936 8,627 86 1966 1)4,637 111.6
1938 8,797 88 1968 17,76)4 178
19110 7, 952 79 1970 17, 922 179
Source: National Conference of Bar Examiners, Bar Exam1ner various issues.20
B. Actual and Equilibrium Earnings of Lawyers
No continuous series of lawyer earnings exists and those that do exist
are limited. From 1929 to l95)- the Department of Commerce surveys estimate
the income of lawyers in individual practice. The Internal Revenue Service
(I.R.S.) provides taxreturndata of the net income of sole proprietors sub-
mitting Schedule C and informational return data of partners in 19-9 and 1953
and annually since 1957. The twoserieswere spliced together by (l inter-
polating the I.R.S. data from 1953 to 1957, and (2) adjusting the I.R.S.
series upward by 27 percent since the Department of Commerce data exceed the
I.R.S. data by an average of 27 •percent in 19b9 and 1953, two recentyears
1/ . . wherea comparison is possible.— A more detailed discussion of the income
data is presented in Appendix B.
Real lawyer earnings from 1929 to 1970 (in 19117 prices) are shown by
the series marked I in Figure II. Real earnings of lawyers remainedfairly
stable from 1929 to the middle fifties and increased markedly thereafter. The
right hand side of equation (6) may be used to calculate an estimate of equi-
librium earnings of lawyers. Because a long time series of earnings ofcollege
graduates or of high school graduates does not exist, annual earnings of full
time employees were adjusted upward to derive an estimate of the earnings of
high school graduates (see Appendix B). r was arbitrarily set at .10, an
estimate close to other estimates of the rate of return on education. The time
'The I.R.S. estimatesare below the Commerce estimates because a
lawyer who is a member of a partnership but also has some independent practice
will submit a Schedule C (as a single proprietor) and will also be included in
the information return of the partnership. A salaried lawyer with a practice
on the side will also submit a Schedule C return. Because of the method of
reporting, I.R.S. estimates of net income per lawyer should be biased downward.
.21
series of estimated equilibrium earnings of lawyers is shown by the series
marked by 0 in Figure II.The actual earnings of lawyers exceeded equi-
librium earnings by decreasing amounts from 1929 to the early fifties. The
discrepancy disappears in the early 1950's but reappears and increases throu,gh-
out the 1960' s. The ratio of actual to equilibrium earnings is showninFigure
III. This ratio equaled 1.67 in 1929, declines, hovers around unity throughout
the early fifties, rises during the sixties and equaled 1.29 in 1970. This
review of the earnings data suggests the market was adjusting to long run
equilibrium between 1929 to the early fifties. Real lawyer earnings remained
flat from 1929 to the mid-fifties while long run equilibrium earnings continued
to increase. New admissions remained relatively high throughout the thirties
because of the relatively favorable earnings of lawyers although the decline
in new admissions in the late thirties is not explained by the relative
earnings data. During the fifties the market for lawyers appears to have been
in long run equilibrium, and the approximate stability of new admissions
during this period is consistent with this conclusion. The rise in new
admissions since 1963 is consistent with the rise in the relative earnings of
lawyers. A surprising finding of this historical review of relative earnings
is that the speed of adjustment to long run equilibrium has been low since the
excess of actual over equilibrium earnings has persisted for relatively long
periods of time.
C. Exogeneous Determinants of the Demand For Legal Services
Given a body of law and current interpretations of this body of law,
increasesinthe level of economic activity will increase the number of
transactionsbetween consumers and firms and between firms and presumably raise
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the number of regulations will also raise the demand for lawyers. Thepurpose
of the econometric estimation is to quantify these two effects)1
Consumers, firms and governments are the major users of the services
of lawyers. Recent surveys do allow some perspective on the relative importance
of consumers and firms as contributors to revenue of the legal service industry,
i.e. single proprietors and partnerships and certain nonprofit firms. In
19)48 the Department of Commerce reported consumers accounted for 52 percent
of total billings of the legal service industry [Winfield, 19)49]. The 1972
Census of Selected Services reported consumers accounted for 53 percent
of total billings. Individuals appear to produce about the same dollar volume
as firms do and somewhat surprisingly, the consumer share has not declined
over tinie.￿/ -
Severalproxy variables have been used to identify those transactions
where the services of a lawyer are likely to be used. The variables and the
symbols used are discussed below.
!JTime seriesanalysis may be a superior way of measuring the adjust-
ruent to equilibrium while a cross state analysis may be a superior way of
identifying the separate effects of each of the variables on the demand for
lawyers since the variables in the demand equation tend to move together
through time.
'In house council andgovernment lawyers would be excluded from these
figures.
'If the burden of theincreasing scope of regulation has been placed
on firms, it should have caused a relative rise in the use of the legal service
industry by the business sector. If this effect is operating, it has been
offset by a corresponding rise in the services demanded by consumers.25
1. Consumer
Besides the level of real income, certain transactions have been
singled out for analysis.
a. Real Estate Transactions (MORG): A continuous time series real
estate transactions does not exist. Nonfarm housing mortgage loans made by
savings and loans deflated by the rent price index were used as a measure of
the volume of transactions in the real estate market):!
b. Divorce (DIV): The total divorce rate per 1000 population was
used.
c. Automobile Accidents (LOSS): Real dollar losses paid by insurance
companies for auto insurance (property and liability) divided by total motor
vehicle registrations was used.
2. Business
Transactions among firms create a demand for legal services. The volume
of transactions among firms in an economy will be directly related to the size
of the economy. Given the size of the economy, the number of transactions
requiring legal services will depend on the average size of the firm.
If there are relatively few firms in the economy so that the average size of
a firm is relatively large, the demand for legal services should be smaller
since the number of nonmarket transactions increases, i.e., transactions within
the firm will be larger. As the number of firms increases, the number of market
transactions will rise and with it the demand for legal services. Still further
I/Shorter series of the volume of mortgage recordings do exist. By
combining these measures, a-time series of mortgage recordings can be con-
structed. No change in results was obtained with these alternative measures.26
increases in the number of firms may reduce the demand for legal services since
smaller firms are likely to use other less costly methods of resolving and
enforcing conflicts. Given the size of the economy the demand for legal
services is likely to rise with increases in the size of the firm up to a
point and thereafter decrease because more nonmarket transactions occur.
The proxy measures used to represent business demand for legal services are:
a. Real Gross National Product (RGNP): The number of market trans.-
actions among firms and the demand for legal services is expected to rise
with real gross national product.
b. Number of Firms (AC): Because a continuous series of the business
population is unavailable, the number of active corporations as reported by
the Internal Revenue Service was used.
3. Judicial and Regulatory Activity
The central difficulty in measuring the effect of government regulation
on the number of lawyers is that the available measures of regulation are
deficient in one or more ways. Some new laws or regulations create legal
uncertainties which are resolved through court activity. Measures of court
activity are available and may be used as a proxy for government regulation.
However, some new laws are sufficiently precise and some judicial interpretations
are so clear that the amount of subsequent judicial activity will be negligible
even though the effect on the demand for lawyers can be large. A new tax
law may increase the demand for (tax) lawyers without an appreciable
increase in subsequent court activity. While, the effects of regulation are
large, they would not be reflected in court activity. Hence, court activity
is an admittedly imperfect proxy for the scope of government regulation.27
Rules promulgated andenforcedby regulatory commissions raise
similar issues. On the other hand the scope of activity of regulatory
commissions cannot be independent of the available resources. The number and
thoroughness of investigations and the level of enforcement of regulations
depend on the size of the budgets of these commissions. It is assumed that
the scale of activity of regulatory commissions is directly related to resources
available to these agencies.
The proxy variables for regulatory activity are
a. Court Activity (TCA). Number of Federal District court cases
commenced plus the number of bankruptcies filed is used. It should be noted
thejudicial activity at the state level has been ignored.
b. Regulatory Commission Activity (BEG). The total real budget of
•
15 federal regulatory agencies wasusedas the measure of regulatory activity
[see Stigler, l972]. It is worth examining the behavior ofthismeasure
overtime relative to the size of the economy to see if it conforms with con-
ventional views of changes in government regulation. Regulatory expenditures
per $10,000 of gross national product for selected years are shown in
Table IV. Relative to the size of the economy, regulatory input declined
during the late twenties, rose during the thirties and reached a peak by 19110.
An erratic pattern followed with a decline in the middle fifties. Regulatory
expenditures have increased relative to the economy since the late fifties so
1The agencies include the AntitrustDivision Civil Aeronautics Board,
CommodityExchange Authority, Federal Communication Commission, Federal Home
Loan Bank, Federal Maritime Commission, Federal Power Commission, Federal Trade
Commission,Food and Drug Administration,InterstateCommerceCommission, NationalLabor Relations Board, Administration of the Packers and Stockyard
Act, Securities and Exchange Commission, Tariff Commission and the Wage and
Hour Division.28 .
TABLEIV
EXPENDITURES ON 15 FEDERAL REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
per$10,000 OF GI)SS NATIONAL PRODUCT
Year Exp. per $10,000 Year Exp. per $lo,ooo
1925 $1.95 1950 $2.23
1929 1.30 1955 1.62
1935 1.91 1960 2.32
1940 3.51i 1965




that by 1976theratio was approaching the high of the late thirties. This
series suggests that the scope of regulation was widest in the late thirties
and late sixties during the 1925-1970 period. It should be noted the rate
of growth of lawyers was declining in the late thirties, while increasing in
the late sixties. Further, the decline in the scope of regulation in the
late twenties was accompanied by a continued growth in new admissions. This
admittedly partial analysis ofthedata suggests that regulatory expenditures
havenot had a large quantitative effect on the demand for lawyers.
As an aid to the reader a siimmPry ofthesymbols used for each variable
ispresented inChartI.
III. Regression Results
Regression results for equations (l6a) and (l6b) are displayed in
Table V. These equations were estimated with the Hildrith—Lu search process
over a grid of values for the first order serial correlation coefficient, p.
Results are presented for the smallest transformed sum of squares.
The coefficient of Lt_i is positive in (16a) and negative in (l6b)
if w > d. Except for twD cases, the estimated coefficients have the correct
signs.The numerical magnitude of thesecoefficients indicates the speed of
adjustmenttoward long run equilibrium is relatively low. The estimates in
columns 1-4 indicate w ranges from .03 to .17.This finding is independent
of,but consistent with, the slow adjustment of actual lawyer earnings to
long run equilibrium earnings noted above.
Twovariableswere used to measure the opportunity cost of choosing
thelaw as an occupation and both indicate a rise in earnings outside of the30
CHART 1
SUMMARY OFVARIABLESMiD SYMBOLS
1. L, =Numberof lawyers in t (Census Estimate).
2.PEA =Realannualeanlingsper full time employee (all industries)
adjusted for probability of failure and for years required
beyondhigh school to complete law school in t.
3.RGNP =Realgrossnational product in t.
.
BGNPP
=Realgross national product per capita in t.
5. AC
=Totalnumber of active corporations in t.
6. 1At =Totalnumber of district court; cases commenced in t plus
total number ofbankruptcies filed in t.
7. PEC
=Realgross national product per active corporation in t.
8. EPTt =Realgross national product per 1A in t.
9. DIV.
=Divorcerate in t.
10. CC. =Districtcourt cases commenced in t.
11.LOSS. =Reallosses paid by auto insurance companies for property
and liability coverage per motor vehicle registration
in t.
12.MORGt =Nonfarmhousing mortgage loans made by Savings and Loan
Associations divided by Rent Index of C.P.I. in t.
13.BMiKt =Numberof bankruptcies filed in t.
l. REGt =Realbudgets o± 15 federal regulatory agencies from 1925 to
1970.
*Denotescoefficient has t statistic between 1.60 and1.99.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































. legalprofession reduces the number of lawyers. REA measures longrun
equilibrium earnings and is derived from real annual earnings of full time
workers in the private sector. RGNPP measures realper capita gross national
product. Given BEA, a rise in RGNPP is thought to reflect an improvementin
employment opportunities in the private sector and, for thisreason, leads to
a reduction in the number of lawyers)1
The most important determinant of the demand forlegal services and
for lawyers is real gross national product. Shifts in thedemand for lawyers
are due for the most part to changes in real income. On the otherhand, the
form in which wealth is held appears to have little differentialeffect on the
demand forlawyers. No consistent effect of real property andliability
lossespaidby automobile insurance companies or of the measures for the turn-
over of the housing stock were observed. It appears that increases in real
income increases the number of transactions, a fraction of whichrequire
consumers and firms to use the services of lawyers.
The time series results do indicate the divorce rate isa significant
but quantitatively small determinant of the demand forlawyers. So, marital
instability does increase the number of lawyers but this effect is small
compared to a comparable increase in real income.
RGrPPvaries more over time than REA and is more sensitive to
cyclicalchanges. REAis a measure of opportunity cost assuming the worker
is employed full time in the private sector. On the otherhand, fluctuation
in RGNPP appear as a proxy for employment conditions in theprivate sector,
improving when RGNPP rises. While other methods of adjusting forchanges in
employment conditions have not been explored, an alternative is to adjust
REA directly for under and unemployment.
.33
Theeffect of the size of corporation on the demand for lawyer is
unclear. Columns (2) and (1.) indicate an increase in the size of corporation
increases the number of lawyers. However, this result is sensitive to the
inclusion of real per capita income (columns 1 and 3). Great reliance cannot
be placed on this result.
Differenteffects are observed for the regulatory variables. Total
court activity is positively related to the demandforlawyers andtonew
admissions if per capita income is excluded. Column(l) suggests that the
number of court cases and not thenumberof bankruptcies isimportant. If
court activity is a measure of the increasing scope of government regulation,
then there is some support for the hypothesis that regulation increases the
demand for lawyers. However, this effect is quantitatively small (see
below). The budgets of regulatory commissions have no significant effects on
the number of lawyers and are inversely related to new admissions. Hence,
this measure of regulation does not suggest that the legal profession benefits
from regulation.
Insummarythenumber of lawyers appears to decline with increases
in the foregone earningsof becoming a lawyer.The quantity demanded of
legalservices appears to increase with the level of economic activity,
the divorce rate, the scale of judicial activity and may decrease with
thescale of regulatory activity.
The quantitative effect of a one percent change in each variable on
the long-run numberoflawyers is shown in Table VI. These elasticities
wereobtained by letting Lt =Lt1in (l6a) and solving for the equilibriumTABLE VI
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITY OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
NUMBER OF LAWYERS a
aElll. evaluated at the mean values of the variables and derived




Col. 1 Col. 2 Cal. 3 Col. 4
Variable
1.REA —3.78 —.52 —1.90 —.60
2.RGNP 2.07 1.80 1.52 1.94
3.AC .77 —.18
4.RPC . —.52 .21
5.MORG .06
6.TCA .82 .07 .37
7.REG — .i6 — .24 — .07 - .06
8.DIV i.i4 .32 .74 .30
9.CC .03
10.BA1IK .04
11.LOSS .56 0 .19
12.RGNPP -1.54 -1.8635
numberof lawyers. The elasticities are evaluated at the meanvaluesof the
variables. The estimates in columns 2 andarederived from the tworegres-
sions with the highest explanatory power. If reliance is placed on these
estimates, it appears that the real product elasticity is in the i.8 to2.0
range.The elasticities of the other variables in the demand curve are
decidedly lower with the divorce rate elasticity around .3. It is apparent
thatthe major variable increasing the demand for lawyers has been the
increase in real gross national product. A 10 percent increase in long run
equilibriumearnings and in real per capita income reduces the number of
lawyers by 2.0 to 2.5percent.L"
IV. The Equilibrium Number of Lawyers
Equation(l6a) may besolved for the equilibrium numberof lawyers,
LE, by letting Lt =Lti
=L
(17) L = {(a - + a2 +(a1
-)
-((1+r) 3UtHt)]
Theequilibrium number of lawyers in each year maybederived by setting
'If a profession maximizedthe total wage billof its existing
members, the salary per member would be determined so that salary elasticity
equals -1. The results suggest the salary (earnings) elasticity is less
than -1. This evidence does not indicate the pass rate on the bar examination
hasbeen determined so as to maximize totalearnings.It should be noted
the elasticities are calculatedon the assumption that the actual number
oflawyers equals the equilibrium number. Since the actual number hasoften
beenless than the equilibrium number,the actual elasticities will differ
from the elasticities shown in Table VI.36
Lt_i =0and dividing the r.h.s. of (16a) by one minus the coefficient of
Lti. The estimated coefficients have been used to derive L€ in equation
(17). The estimate of the equilibrium number of lawyers in a givenyear
assumes (1) the exogenous variables remain constant thereafter,(2) the
equilibrium rate of return on legal education equals 10 percent, and (3) the
completion rates of law students are exogenous.!" By comparing this time
series of the equilibrium number of lawyers with the actual time series of
lawyers,itis possible to determine the time periods when the rate of return
onlegaleducation exceeded 10 percent. Whenever the actual number of lawyers
is less than the equilibrium number, it may be inferred that the actual rate
of return on legal education exceeded 10 percent.
Figure IV shows the equilibrium and actual number of lawyers in each
yearfrom l925_19140and 1951-1970.The equilibrium number oflawyers was
estimatedfrom the coefficient estimates (column 2 of Table V); the regression
with the smaller residual standard error. Table VII shows the ratio ofequi-
librium toactual number of lawyers and the ratio of actual to equilibrium
earningsfor selectedyears.The ratio of equilibrium to actual number of
lawyer is largest in the mid-twenties and declines thereafter and approaches
one in 19110. After the post war adjustment, the ratio hovers near but some-
what aboveunitythrou.ghout the nineteen fifties and then rises from 1960 to
1970 and was in the 1. 17-1.19 range in 1970, notfar different from the value
reachedin 1929. The time series pattern of the ratio of actual to equilibrium
earnings shows a similar pattern except for one major exception. The ratio
.i/'Completion rates arepositively correlated with the rate of return
to the investment on legal education. If the rate of return to legal education
fell to 10 percent, the completion rates would decline, equilibrium earnings
of lawyers would rise, and the equilibrium number of lawyers would decrease.
Hence, the estimates of the equilibrium number of lawyers are biased upward
when the completion rates are considered exogenous.37
ofearnings is largest in 1929 and declines throughout the thirties. However,
the ratio of earnings far exceeds unity in l94O while the ratio of equilibrium
to actual number of lawyers is near unity in 191lO. In the post war period the
ratio of earnings remains near unity throughout the fifties and then rises
from 1960 to 1970 and equals 1.29 in 1970. The two independent tests, the
ratio of earnings and the ratio of numbers suggest the rate of return to
legal education exceeded 10 percent throughout the twenties, most of the
thirties, and throughout the sixties.!/
Figure IV reveals why an equilibrium was finally achieved in the middle
fifties. The equilibrium number of lawyers grew by only •14 percent per year
from 1925 to 19)40 and by about .6percentper year from 1925 to 1956.
Changesin real income, divorce rates and other determinants of the demand
for legal services were on balance offset by increases in the opportunity cost
of legal education, so that the equilibrium number of lawyers demanded at
long run equilibrium earnings did not increase appreciably over a 30 year
period ending in the middle fifties.
Given the low speed of adjustment in the production of lawyers, a
long run equilibrium was not achieved until the late thirties. After the
post war adjustment a long run equilibrium was reestablished throughout the
This comparison of the ratio of earnings to the ratio of numbers
indicates the actual earnings of lawyers reported by the Department of Commerce
during the thirties are probably biased upward. The ratio of equilibrium to
actual number of lawyers suggests the market was close to equilibrium by 19)40.
The depreciation rate of the stock of lawyers was relatively high for the
decade of the thirties compared to the twenties. These two sources of infor-
mation raise the suspicion that the earnings of lawyers reported in thesurveys
conducted by the Department of Commerce during the 1930's are biased upward.
The surveys conducted in the post war period do not indicate the same degree
of bias. No explanation can be offered for the apparent improvement in the
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TABLE VII
RATIO OF EQUILIBRflJ1v TO ACTUAL LAWYERS AND RATIO
OF LAWYER EARNINGS TO OPPORTWITY COST
OF LEGAL EDUCATION
Year
Ratio of Equilibrium to
Number of Lawyers





Col.2, Table I Col.)4, TableI
1.29 1.32
1929 1.16 1.18 1.68
1935 1.08 1.09 1.58
194O 1.03 1.03 1.!13
1951 1.07 1.08 1.02
1955 l.O4 1.05 i.O1i
1960 1.05 1.06 i.o)-i-
1965 l.14 1.15 1.31
1970 1.17 1.19 1.29t.O
fifties. Increases in RGNP and other demand determinants throughout the
1960's have increased the demand for legal services. Onceagain, the low
speed of adjustment of places in law schools created a gap between the actual
and equilibrium number of lawyers. By 1970 the ratio of equilibrium to
actual number of lawyers was between 1.17 to 1.19, not far different from
the ratio in 1929.
V. Other Evidence
Other evidence indicates a widening discrepancy between the actual
and equilibrium number of lawyers throughout the sixties and into the early
seventies. Table VIII shows the number of (LSAT) tests administered to
prospective law school students relative to first year law students and the
mean score on the tests administered. Comparable data are shown for prospective
graduate students in business. In both law and business there has been a rapid
rise in total tests administered. However, the trend to testing occurred
earlier in law than in business so that a smaller proportion of the increase
in testing intensity (columns 3 and ti-)isdue to the rise in the number
of law schools requiring testing.1 The evidence suggests that there has been
an increasing interest in entering law school and probably an increase in the
quality of law students.1 In contrast the mean score of prospective business
'The number of schoolsrequiring the test is unknown. However, conver-
sations with informed individuals suggests that most law and business schools
were requiring the test by the middle sixties.
'The number of testsadministered differs from the number of individuals
taking the test since some individuals repeat the test. The repeat rate appears
to be higher in law than in business. The higher repeat rate in law than
business is consistent with a larger discrepancy between the actual and equi-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ifthe student drops out of law school after 2 years (virtually all dropouts




The present value of earnings for a student entering law school is:
(6a)
(lr)*+ (i-) ((l+r) U(l+rh)2)
In longrunequilibrium the present value of not entering law school







Equation(7a) may be derived by substituting for L from (3a).
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TABLEDC
CHANGEIN MARKETSHARE OFFULL TThE EQUIVALENT LAWSTUDENTS
BY QUALITY OF LAWSCHOOl
1958-1973
Type of Law School 1958 1973h Changer'
I. Private Law Schools, 1958-1973
A. Approved by A.B.A. in 1958
1.Nine highest quality law
schoolsb) 17 8 -9
2. Eleven next highest quality
law schoolsc) 13 9 _14
3. Other approved schools
(56schools) 27 30
B. Not approved y A.B.A. in 1958
(31 schoo1s)d) 5 5
C. Law schools established after
1958
1.Approved in 1973 (10 schools) 5 +5
2. Not approved in 1973
(18 schools) 5 +5
Total private, 1958-1973 62 62
II. Private Law Schools that Became
Public Between 1959 and 1973
(7 schools) 4 4
III. Public Law Schools, 1958-1973
e"
A. Ten highest quality law schools 11 8 -3
B. Fifteen next highest quality
law schools) 13 12 -l
C. Other public law schools in
1958 (30 schools) 10 12 +2
D. Law schools established after
1958 (10 schools) 3 +3
Total public, 1958-1973 34 35 +1
IV. Total Enrollment
)
(Full Time Equivaleflt) 35,505100,682 +65,177
V. Market Share of Highest Quality
Private and Public Law Schools
(ml +lIlA) 28 16 -1244
.
Footnotesto Table DC
a) Evening students in 1958 and part-time students in 1973 assumed equal
to one-half of full time morning student.
b) Thition in 1958 equals 70% or more of the mean of three private law
schools with highest tuition and volumes in library in 1973 exceed-
ing 200,000.
c) Tuition in 1958 exceeds 54% or more of the mean of three private law
schools with highest tuition and volumes in library in 1973 between
100,000 and 200,000.
d) Not all schools reported enrollment in 1958.
e) Non-resident tuition in 1958 equals 70% or more of the meanofthree
public law schools with highest nonresident tuition and volumes in
libraryin 1973 exceeding 200,000.
f) Nonresidenttuition in 1958exceeds54%ormore of the mean of three
publiclaw schools with highest nonresident tuition and volumes in
library in 1973 between 100,000 and 200,000.
g) Enrollment figures estimated from data published in AmericanBar
Association, Law Schools and Bar Admission Requirements in the
UnitedStates, 1958and 1973.
h)May not add due to rounding.
Source:American Bar Association, Law Schools Bar Admission Requirements,
1958 and 1973 editions.
.quality variation presumably also exists in other fields, e.g. business.
A detailed study of business education has not yet been undertaken. However
supply response of the business education sector is not likely to be as slow.
A major difference between law and business is the ease of entry into the
education sector. A comparison between law and business is instructive.
While both sectors have experienced a rapid increase in the demand for pro-
fessional education, they differ in the number of new schools entering the
market. The number of business schools offering graduate programs increased
from 183 in 1960-61, 254 in 1966-67 and 360 in 1972-73. Similar counts
of the number of law schools are 158 in 1960-61, 166 in 1966-67 and 190 in
1972-73. The number of business schools increased by about 97 percent
since 1960 while the number of law schools has increased by 20 percent.
The comparatively modest expansion in the number of law schools may explain
why the ratio of tests administered to first year students has increased
more rapidly in law than in business since the middle sixties (when realistic
comparisons are possible) and why the mean score of prospective law students
has increased relative to mean score of prospective business students.
A further test of the regression results is to explain behavior after
1970. The empirical results suggest that the rate of return to legal educa-
tion exceeded 10 percent in 1970. The ratio of equilibrium to actual number
of lawyers was between 1.17 and 1.19. The subsequent behavior of first year
enrollments and new admissions is consistent with this evidence. Table X
shows first year students enrolled in law schools and new admissions, the
equilibrium and actual number, and the estimates of the number of lawyers
from 1970 to 1974. The equilibrium number of lawyers is estimated with the
actual or extrapolated values of the exogenous variables from 1971 to 1974.Table X shows first year students increased somewhat from 1970 to
197)4 and remained at relatively high levels between 1973 and l974. If the
difference between the equilibrium and actual number of lawyers had declined
from 1970 to 19711., the number of first year students should have declined.
The evidence suggests that the gap between the equilibrium and actual number
of lawyers increased from 1970 to 1973 and then declined in 197)4 and helps
explain why the size of the first year class has not declined appreciably.
Nevertheless, the large number of new admissions in 1973 and 197)4 has sub-
stantially increased the number of practicing lawyers and a subsequent decline
in the size of the first year class would not be surprising.
Conclusions
During the last half century the legal profession has experienced
two extended periods of prosperity. The first period covered the twenties
and the early thirties and the second the sixties and the first half of the
seventies. Both periods correspond to periods of rapid growth in real gross
national product, the major determinant of the demand for legal services. The
length of these prosperous episodes appears due to the slow adjustment of
places in law schools. The slow supply adjustment causes the rate of return
to legal education to rise when demand increases and to remain above a normal
rate of return for extended periods of time. The existing stock of lawyers.
has gained from the slow supply response in the legal education industry.
A more rapid supply adjustment would shorten the number of periods when the
rate of return exceeded a normal return. Some tentative explanations for
the slow response have been considered. The slow response may be due in partTABLE X
FIRST YEAR STUDENTS, NE ADMISSION AND EQUILIBRIUM
























































'Estimated from thecoefficients In column 14 of Table 2.
'Reported in the 1970 Census ofPopulation.
Li/Estimatedby using the annual depreciation rate of .02984esti-
mated for the 1960-1970 decade.to the nonprofit character of the suppliers in the legal education industry.
Higher quality law schools act as if a high marginal tax rate is placed on the
net income of the school. In addition entry in the legal education sector
appears more difficult than in business education sector. These arguments
imply that the supply response would be faster if the legal education industry
was organized with profit maximizing suppliers or under the apprenticeship
system.
The importance of cobweb oscillations in the market for lawyers can
be best assessed after study of an extended time series. During the last
fifty years the market for lawyers has been marked by two extended periods of
adjustment to long run equilibrium and one extended period in or near long run
equilibrium. Cob'web oscillations due at first to "too many" and then "too few"
lawyers do not describe the market for lawyers in the last fifty years. The
slow supply response and the ease with which lawyers may shift into other
occupations mitigate against cobweb type oscillations. While many believe
the number of lawyers is excessive, the historical evidence suggests that there
have been on balance too few lawyers. The current wave of warnings of a future
glut of lawyers should also be evaluated in light of the historical record.
The findings of this study suggest the economic status of the legal
profession is closely tied to the performance of the economy and not to scale
of government regulation. Consequently, additions to the stock of lawyers
should decline in the future unless there is an unexpected increase in the
rate of economic growth. At the present time the earnings of lawyers appear
to be abnormally high. A decline in the relative earnings of lawyers may be




Let be the probability of completing law school andpbe the
probabilityof passing the bar examination during the year. Suppose a
student graduates from law school. If the student passes the bar, the present




where LE (assumed constant) equals the annual earnings of a lawyer. Define
*
Las the present value of taking the bar examination. Then the present value
of earnings for a student that fails the examination is:
(2a) U(l +rh)+
1rL*where h < 1.





+ (1-p) [u(l +rh)3+
1r
L*]
Consider a student entering law school. If the student graduates from




Ifthe student drops out of law school after 2 years (virtually all dropouts




The present value of earnings for a student entering law school is:
(6a)
(lr)*+ (i-) ((l+r) U(l+rh)2)
In longrunequilibrium the present value of not entering law school







Equation(7a) may be derived by substituting for L from (3a).
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APPENDIX B
AppendixB displays lawyer income data from four different sources
and briefly describes the methods used to calculate long run equilibrium
earnings.
I. The Net Income and Earnings of Lawyers
The net income data for lawyers for selected years is shown in Table Bi.
In 197)4 and 1953 the Department of Commerce estimates exceed the Internal Revenue
Service estimates (column (1) compared to column (5)) by about twenty-seven
percent. Median earnings reported in the 19)49 Census of Population are not out-
of-line with the 1949 Department of Commerce estimate of mean income, given the
skewness of lawyer income distribution.
Column (6) displays the Internal Revenue Service estimate adjusted upward
by twenty-seven percent. The adjusted estimate in 1959 is less than the 1959
Census of Population estimate of mean earnings by 19 percent, a relatively large
amount, but exceeds the 1969 Census of Population estimate by only 4 percent.
While a changing proportional upward adjustment of the I.R.S. figures would have
been preferable to a fixed upward adjustment of 27 percent, the Census of
Population figures do not reveal a systematic upward or downward bias in the
adjusted I.R.S. estimates. Some further support for the upward adjustment
comes from a special tabulation of the 1971 income tax returns. For returns
with a Schedule C, the amount of other sources of income in 1971, e.g., wage
and salary income, was reported. If lawyers operating single proprietorships
also obtain considerable wage and salary income, the income estimates based












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Footnotes to Table Bi
'U.S. Department ofCommerce, Survey of Current Business (u.s.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: various issues).
'Median Income in l949 ofExperience Civilian Labor Force, Male,
lawyers and judges. Income includes wages and salary plus income from own
professional practice or partnership. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II.
Characteristics of the Population, Part I, U.S. Summary Table 129.
'MeanEarnings in 1959 of Males 25-6)4 years old in the Experienced
Civilian Labor Force, lawyers and judges. Median Earnings equals $10,587.
Median Wage and Salary income of Wage and Salary male workers equals $8,537.
U.S. Census of Population: 1960, Occupational Characteristics PC(2)-7A and
Occupation by Earnings and Education PC(2)-7B. (Note: earnings equal wage
or salary and self-employment income.) Mean earnings are reported in PC(2)-7D.
Earnings in 1969 of males 25-6)4 years old with earnings in
Experienced Civilian Labor Force, Lawyers and judges. Median Earnings equal
$l9,)466. Median Earnings of all males (with or without earnings) equal $18,870.
Median Wage and Salary earnings of wage and salary male workers equal $1)4,791+.
Median of Total Family Income in 1969 of families with male heads reported as
lawyers in the Experienced Civilian Labor Force equals $23,037. Census of
Population: 1970, Earnings by Occupation and Education, PC(2)-8B and
Occupational Characteristics, PC(2)-7A.
'Net profit of soleproprietors (Schedule C) plus compiled net
profit of partnerships plus salaries paid to partners (information return)
divided by the sum of number of returns by sole proprietors plus number of
partners.
VExcludes salariespaid to partners.5)4 S
'Colunm5 multiplied by 1.27. Average ratio of net income per lawyer
in independent practice to combined income reported by I.R.S. in 19149 and 1953
is 1.27. The ratios of mean income per lawyer (salaried and nonsalaried)
reported by Census of Population to combined income reported by I.R.S. in 1959
and 1969 are 1.51 and 1.23 respectively. The 1959 ratio appears abnormally
large while the 1969 ratio is close to the average ratio of 1.27. The mean of
the ratios for 19)49, 1953 and 1969 is 1.255.
h/ . . — U.S.Department of Labor, National Survey of Professional, Administrative,
Technical and Clerical Pay (Government Printing Office, Washington) various
issues. Annual salary for standard work schedules excludes overtime but includes
cost of living and incentive payments.
'Date ofsurvey changes from February to June.
'Change in definition of work level andexperience required for each
level. Comparability between 1967 and 1968 data is in question.
WDate ofsurvey changes from June to February.
In1971 Business Statistics reports the distribution of income for
returns with Schedule C. Adding wages and salaries reported, partnership income
and loss from proprietorships in other industries raises the reported income per
return to 22,7lO. This may overestimate the return from legal practice since
wages and salaries may include wages and salaries of other members of the
household.
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legalpractice. When wages and salaries, partnership income and loss from
proprietorships in other industries are added to income reported on Schedule C,
the 1971 income per proprietor increases from $l)4,170 to *22,710. The income
per lawyer (including proprietors and partners) rises from *22,030 to $26,570
which is only 5 percent less than the 1971 adjusted value of $27,978. This
test also suggests the 27 percent upward adjustment is not in great error.
The mean annual salaries of lawyers employed by firms in the private
sector reported by the Department of Labor (column (7)) are near the combined
I.R.S. estimate but less than the adjusted I.R.S. estimates and less than the
Census of Population estimates of earnings. The Census of Population figures
generally show the wage and salary income of wage and salary lawyers is less
thanthe earnings of all lawyers and this may account for the lower salary
estimates reported by the Department of Labor.
II.The Calculation of Long Run Equilibrium Earnings
The estimation of long run equilibrium contains the following steps.
The ratio of annual earnings of high school graduates to average annual earnings
of all full time working in private industry was regressed on time for selected
years when annual earnings of high school graduates was available (1939 in the
first such year). The coefficients of this regression equation were used to
convert the average annual earnings of full time workers in private industry
into estimated average annual earnings of high school graduates for the period
l925-194Oand1951-1970.56
The estimated annual earnings of high school graduates in eachyear
was multiplied by (i +r)EDwhere ED represented a three year moving average
of the mean years beyond high school required for completion of law school.
The series for mean years beyond high school to complete law schoolwas
obtained by taking a random sample of law school and calculating a mean value
for each year. The result of this product was then multiplied by
II
(equation 7) where p equals the proportion passing the bar in tand
equals the third year students in t -1divided by first year students in
t -5.h was arbitrarily set at .05 and r.10 was considered a normal
rate of return on the investment in education.
.57
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